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THE TRANSFER OF INTERESTS IN ASSOCIA-
TIONS.
SECOND PAPER.'
Let it be supposed that A has purchased from B inno-
cently and for value a certificate which affirms that B is the
registered owner of the number of shares of stock therein
specified. Let it be further supposed that this certificate
has been improvidently issued by -the corporation and that
B is not in fact the owner.2 The question is, what are the
rights of A against the corporation? It is assumed that A
purchased upon the faith of the formal representation by
the corporation of B's ownership of the shares, as distin-
guished from the case in which A is deceived into buying
from a thief or from the forger of a power of attorney, a
certificate which truthfully certifies to the ownership of
the person whose name it bears and afterwards effects a
'The former paper appeared in AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, vol. lii,
page Y37. The transfer of a partner's interest was there considered and
the discussion of the transfer of shares made transferable by statute was
begun. It was suggested that a transferable share in the common stock
is property of such a kind that legal title to it passes only by transfer
upon the books of the company. Delivery of the certificate, with an
assignment and power of attorney duly executed, confer upon the
holder an equitable right to effectuate a transfer and, upon surrender
of the old certificate, to compel the issue of a new certificate to him.'
As the certificate is evidence of ownership of property, it is not regarded
as a negotiable instrument By putting it within the power of the
holder of the certificate to induce belief that he has a right to the shares,
the registered owner may estop himself from setting up the legal title.
In the present paper it is proposed to discuss the liability of the corpora-
tion for falsely or mistakenly certifying that the person named in the
certificate is the owner of a share and also its liability in case transfer
is permitted without the surrender of the old certificate.
'The corporation may have been led to issue such a certificate in a
variety of ways. The case may be one in which a forged transfer has
been brought in, as in the cases discussed in the former paper. Or the
corporation may have permitted the transfer and issued a new certificate
at the request of one who has in good faith purchased a, duly endorsed
certificate from the person who has stolen it from the owner. Or, again,
the corporation may have carelessly issued the new certificate without
requiring the production of the old certificate accompanied by a power
of attorney to transfer.
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transfer into his own name and causes a new certificate to
be issued.3 Where A gives value on the faith of the repre-
sentation by the corporation it seems clear that the corpora-
tion should be liable to A and should be compellable to issue
stock to him or to respond in damages. The corporation
is estopped from disputing the facts upon which A relied.
4
Wherever specific relief can be given, the plaintiff should
seem to be entitled to it.5 It often happens, however, that
specific performance is impossible because the full amount
of authorized stock is outstanding, in which case the plain-
tiff can obtain nothing but damages.
6
X was the registered owner of stock in the B company.
Y, X's clerk, instructed a broker to sell X's stock. C, D,
and E became the ultimate purchasers and gave the names
of F and G as the names of the transferees. Y forged the
transfer to F and G. Upon presentation of the transfer the
company sent a written notice to X which Y intercepted.
Receiving no answer from X, the company permitted 'the
transfer, but before a new certificate was issued to F and
G, F and G executed a further transfer to A of a number
of shares which included those supposed to have been
bought from X and others in addition. This transfer to A
was duly registered and the company issued a certificate
certifying that A was the registered holder of the stock. F
and G were merely the nominees of C, D, and E, and A
accepted the stock as trustee for C, D, and E, subject
to any lien or claim which a certain bank might have thereon.
Subsequently the forgery of X's name was discovered, and
X claimed to be the proprietor of the stock. The indebted-
' See citation from the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in Moores v.
Citizens' Nat'l Bank (iii U. S. 156, 1883), page 242 infra, note.
'Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 193 (1877), is a decision perhaps not
in harmony with this view. For a criticism of this case, see "The
Compulsory Duplication of Stock Certificates," by E. A. Harriman,
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, VOL. xxxvi, N. S., page 83. The decision is
probably attributable to the fact that the certificates relied upon by in-
nocent purchasers were issued by the corporation under the compulsion
of a confiscation act passed by the Confederacy. See Cook on Corps.
(5th ed.), § 37r.
.Barkinshaw v. Nicolls, 3 A. C. 1004 (1878).
'In re Bahia, etc., Ry. Co.. L. R. 3 Q. B. 584 (1868); New York,
AT. H. and H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 (1865).
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ness to the bank was paid off, so that A's position was that
of trustee for C, D, and E. A, C, D, and E brought one
action against the B company for having made wrongful
representations respecting the ownership of the stock and
another action for indemnity. Lindley, J., gave judgment
for the plaintiffs, but on appeal the judgment was reversed
on the ground that the defendant had made no representa-
tions upon the faith of which the plaintiffs had acted. Lord
Bramwell used the following language: "C, D, and E
sent to the company a document purporting to be transferred
from X, and in effect demanded to be registered as trans-
ferees of the stock; to this demand the company assented.
How can these facts constitute an estoppel against the
company? . . . The company have made no untrue repre-
sentation: they issued certificates to C, D, and E, but this
they were induced to do by the conduct of that firm." In
re Bahia, etc., Ry. Co. (supra) was distinguished from the
case before the court on the ground that in that case the
company's representation in the certificate had been the in-
ducement to the plaintiffs' action.
7
'Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 5 Q. B. D. i88 (z879).
Lord Justice Lindley appears to have been misled by the introduction
into the controversy of the rights of the bank under the terms of A's
trust. The bank undoubtedly relied upon the company's representation
that A was the owner of the stock and had made advances accordingly.
If at the time the actions were brought the bank's debt had remained
unpaid, A would have been entitled to recover as trustee for the bank.
The indebtedness to the bank having been discharged, however, A was
merely a dry trustee for C, D, and E, who had not been misled by the
company's affirmation that A was the owner of the stock. On the con-
trary, they had themselves unintentionally misled the corporation by
bringing in the forged transfer with which they had previously been
deceived by Y.
In Moores v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank (III U. S. i56, 1883) Mr. Justice
Gray used the following language:
" When a corporation, upon the delivery to it of a certificate of
stock with a forged power of attorney purporting to be executed by
the rightful owner, issues a new certificate to the present holder, who
sells it in the market to one who pays value for it, with no knowledge or
notice of the forgery, the corporation is doubtless not relieved from its
obligation to the original owner, but must still recognize him as a
stockholder, because he cannot be deprived of his property without any
consent or negligence of his. Railway Co. v. Taylor, 8 H. L. Cas. 75i;
Bank v. Lanier, ii Wall, 369; Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S.
369; Pratt v. Copper Co., 123 Mass. iio; Pratt v. Railroad Co., 126
Mass. 443. And the corporation is obliged, if not to recognize the last
purchaser as a stockholder also, at least to respond to him in damages
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A situation may arise in which A purchases upon the
faith of the company's certificate that X is the owner of
the stock although A has knowledge of facts which make
X's title doubtful. If these facts are not known to the
company, it should seem that A cannot enforce liability
against the company. On the other hand, if the facts
known to A were also known' to the company at the
time the certificate was issued in X's name, A is regarded
as having a right to believe that the company had deliber-
ately recognized X's title and had assumed liability to him
and his transferees after a full investigation of the subject."
Let attention now be directed to the case in which a new
for the value of the stock, because he has taken it for value without
notice of any defect, and on the faith of the new certificate issued by
the corporation. In re Bahia and S. F. Ry., L. R. 3 Q. B. 584. Whether,
before the last sale has taken place, the corporation is liable to the
holder of the new certificate, is a question upon which there appears to
have been a difference of opinion in England. According to the de-
cision of Lord Northington in Ashby v. Blackwell, 2 Eden, 299, Amb.
503, it would seem that the corporation would be liable. According to
the decisions of Sir Joseph Jekyll in Hilyard v. South Sea Co., 2 P.
Wms. 76, and of the court of appeal in Simm v. Telegraph Co., 5 Q. B.
Div. i88, it would seem that it would not, because the holder of the
new certificate takes it, not on the faith of that or any other certificate
of the corporation, but on the faith of the forged power of attorney.
However that may be, it is clear that the corporation is not liable to
anyone taking with notice of the forgery in the transfer, or of any
other fact tending to show that the new certificate has been irregularly
issued, unless the corporation has ratified, or received, some benefit
from the transaction.
"In Hart v. Mining Co., L. R. 5 Exch. 111, the plaintiff, a bona fide
purchaser of the shares, had paid assessments thereon to the company
upon the faith pf the certificate issued by it to him after his purchase.
In Barwick v. Bank, L. R. 2 Exch. 259, and in Mackay v. Bank, L. R.
5 P. C. 394, the bank had derived a benefit from the fraud of its agent,
and was held liable upon that ground. The decision in Swift v. Win-
terbotham, L. R. 8 Q. B. 244, that a bank was liable upon its official
manager's representation to one of its customers that the credit of a
certain person was good, was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber.
Swift v. fewsbury, L. R. 9 Q. B. 301. The decision in the Exchequer
Chamber in Queen v. Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co., L. R.
8 Q. B. 42o, that a railway company owning shares of its own stock,
the legal title of which was registered in the name of one of its directors
as trustee for the corporation, should transfer them to a person who,
believing the director to be the absolute owner of the shares, had lent
him money on the deposit of the certificate as security, was contrary to
the judgment of the court of Queen's Bench, and was reversed in the
House of Lords. L. R. 7 H. L. 496." For a statement of the case
which Mr. Justice Gray was deciding, see page 247, infra.
'Mandlebaum v. North American Mining Co., 4 Mich. 465 (1857).
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certificate is issued by the corporation without requiring
the production and surrender of the old certificate. In
such a case the new certificate may be issued after there has
been an actual transfer upon the books or it may be issued
without any such transfer. If A, the registered owner,
persuades the corporation to permit him to transfer his
shares to B without the production or surrender of the old
certificate, a new certificate will be issued to B upon the
face of which it is represented (and in that event truly
represented) that B is the owner of the shares. It may
happen, however, either that the old certificate properly en-
dorsed is outstanding in the hands either of a vendee or
pledgee to whom A has delivered it for value, or it may
happen that after the issue of the new certificate to B, A
may sell or pledge the old certificate to one who gives
value in ignorance of the transfer of the share. In all
these situations it may happen that A is a stockholder who
occupies no official position in the corporation, or it may
happen that A is himself an officer or transfer agent.
In such cases as those just suggested various problems
must receive consideration. In the first place, it must be
determined whether or not the legal title to the shares has
passed in virtue of the transfer on the books to B, not-
withstanding the failure to produce and surrender the old
certificate. If the legal title does not pass by such transfer,
then it is either still in A (absolutely or subject to a pledge)
or in A's vendee in virtue of the delivery of the endorsed
certificate to the latter. Upon this view of the case the
vendee or pledgee could upon surrender of the old cer-
tificate compel the corporation to transfer the share to him
and issue a new certificate. It would follow that the
loss resulting from A's fraud would fall upon B, since
B has acquired no title to "the stock and has taken no
action in reliance upon any representation made by the
corporation and therefore has no rights against it. Dis-
carding the view that the legal title is either in A or
his vendee or pledgee, it will follow that the title by A's
transfer has passed to B, who has now become the legal
owner of the shares. Two questions then immediately
THE TRANSFER OF INTERESTS IN ASSOCIATIONS. 245
present themselves for decision: first, whether B by ac-
cepting the transfer without insisting upon the produc-
tion and surrender of the old certificate is put upon his
inquiry respecting its whereabouts and is thus subjected to
an equity in favor of A's vendee or pledgee; and, second,
if B is not subject to such an equity, does the corporation
owe a duty to those who may be the holders of the old
certificate for value to make no transfer of the shares which
it represents without requiring its production and surrender,
for breach of which duty it may be held answerable in
damages?
B was the president, director, and transfer agent of the
New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Company.
For a period of more than seven years he was permitted by
the directors to have sole charge of the company's New
York transfer office. During that time he fraudulently
over-issued stock and committed various frauds. In the
course of B's dealings, B and his partner became the regis-
tered owners of certain shares of valid stock in the corpora-
tion for which certificates were regularly issued to them.
These certificates, properly endorsed, were pledged by B
with persons who in good faith advanced money upon them.
Thereafter B, without the knowledge of the pledgees, trans-
ferred the shares upon the company's books to S and others
who were purchasers in good faith. The outstanding cer-
tificates were not surrendered or accounted for. Subse-
quently the pledgees presented their certificates at the trans-
fer office, offered to surrender them, and requested permission
to transfer the shares which they represented. Permission
to transfer was refused. In an equitable proceeding insti-
tuted by the company against large numbers of persons
affected in various ways by B's fraud it was determined
that the legal title had passed by the transfer on the books
to B and the other purchasers; that B's title was not sub-
ject to any equity in favor of S, since B has "a right to
presume that no certificate has issued, or if one has, that
his vendor has duly surrendered it for cancellation;" and
that the corporation was liable to S for breach of its duty
to insist upon the surrender of the old certificate before
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making the transfer and permitting the new certificate to
issue. To the objection that A in permitting the transfer
acted in excess of his powers the court replied, first, that the
non-performance of the duty to insist upon production of
the old certificate charged the principal; second, that as
between two innocent persons he must suffer who has
trusted the fraudulent agent; and, third, that the company,
by insisting upon the transfer as effective to the extent of
cutting off S's equitable title, were ratifying the act of the
agent, which therefore they could not affirm in part and
disaffirm as to the residue.9
In the celebrated case just summarized it will be perceived
that the questions now under discussion were considered
with reference to the claim of the pledgee to be indemnified
by the corporation against loss sustained through the trans-
fer of the shares to a purchaser for value. Involved in the
decision was the view that the purchaser was not at fault in
accepting the transfer without requiring the production of
the old certificate. If the facts be varied by assuming that
B, the fraudulent officer, were to issue a false certificate to
the purchaser without making any transfer upon the books,
the question would arise whether the purchaser or pledgee
who has advanced money on the faith of the new certificate
could recover damages from the corporation for the mis-
representation. If in the Schuyler case the purchaser who
acquired the legal title by transfer acquired it free from
any equity in favor of the holder of the old certificate; it
must have been because the non-production of the old
certificate was a circumstance immaterial to the purchaser's
rights. If, then, it be conceded that the corporation cannot
with legal propriety permit a transfer and issue a new cer-
tificate without calling in the old certificate, it will follow
that, where a new certificate is fraudulently issued without
any precedent transfer, one who advances money on the
faith of the fraudulent certificate is himself guilty of no
omission of duty and may hold the corporation liable for
'New York, New Haven and Hartford R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34N. Y. 30 (1865).
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his loss. Upon such a case of facts, however, it has been
held by the Supreme Court of the United States 10 that one
who lent money to the fraudulent officer upon the faith of
a new certificate issued in the name of the lender and pur-
porting to represent stock transferred on the books by the
officer to the lender, though no transfer was in fact made,
was to be regarded as "having distinct notice that the sur-
render and transfer of the former certificate were prere-
quisites to the lawful issue of the new one, and having
accepted a certificate that she owned stock without taking
any steps to assure herself that the legal prerequisites to the
validity of her certificate, which were to be fulfilled by the
former owner and not by the bank, had been complied with,
she does not, as against the bank, stand in the position of
one who receives a certificate of stock from the proper
officers without notice of any facts impairing its validity."
In so deciding the court declared that the Schuyler case was
distinguishable from the case at the bar. The two points
of distinction mentioned are these: first, that the directors
had been negligent in not making any examination of the
books or of the conduct of the transfer office; second, that
none of the purchasers of false certificates had any means
of knowing that they were not such as the fraudulent officer
was authorized to issue. As to the second point, it is to be
observed that the purchasers of valid shares transferred
without production of the old certificates were in a position
scarcely distinguishable from the position of one who ad-
vanced money on the faith of a new certificate fraudulently
issued without any preceding transfer. Again, if the pur-
chaser or pledgee is in default for not requiring the pro-
duction of the old certificate and cannot recover for that
reason, it should seem to be immaterial whether the first
ground of distinction stated by the court is or is not present
-because to increase the degree of negligence of the cor-
porate officers does not better the position of the plaintiff,
who is said to be disentitled to recover because he is himself
in default. It is submitted that if the two decisions are in
Moores v. Citizens' National Bank of Piqua, iii U. S. 156 (t883).
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conflict, the advantage of position rests with the New York
court. A reading of the facts of Moores v. Citizens'
National Bank will satisfy most people that the decision
worked actual injustice. It is interesting to note that Mr.
Justice Bradley dissented.
In Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. Forty-second
Street and Grand Street Ferry Railroad Co."" the individual
who was secretary, treasurer, and transfe'r agent of a cor-
poration issued a fraudulent certificate bearing his own
signature and a forgery of the president's name purporting
to certify that X, who was the transfer agent's partner and
privy to the fraud, was the owner of the shares specified in
the certificate. X applied to A for a loan on the security
of the certificate properly endorsed, and A, not knowing of
the relation between X and the transfer agent, sent a repre-
sentative to the office of the corporation to inquire whether
X was in fact a stockholder and whether the certificate was
in order. The representative happened to make his inquiry
of the transfer agent himself, who assured him that all was
as represented. The loan was made and the collateral was
subsequently sold by X's direction. Transfer to the pur-
chasers was, however, refused; A refunded the purchase
money, took an assignment of the purchasers' rights, and
sued the corporation for damages. Judgment on a verdict
in favor of A was affirmed. The court cited the Schuyler
case with approval and added, "We cannot see how forgery
of the name of the president can relieve the defendant from
liability for the fraudulent acts of its secretary, treasurer,
and transfer agent." It will be perceived in this case that
the position of the pledgee of the fraudulent certificate is
different from that of the plaintiff in the case of Moores v.
Citizens' National Bank (supra) in two particulars: first,
because the certificate was not issued in the name of the
pledgee, and, second, because the pledgee did endeavor to
ascertain from the corporation whether or not the trans-
action was regular. In the Schuyler case the registered
owner transferred the shares to the purchaser, the title
U137 N. Y. 231 (893).
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passed, and the corporation was held liable to the holder
of the old certificate for permitting the transfer without
requiring the production of the certificate. In the Moores
case there was no t:ansfer, but there was the fraudulent
issue of a false certificate to a lender who was held to have
no right against the corporation because he should have
been put upon his guard by the non-production of the old
certificate. The distinction between both these cases and
the Fifth Avenue Bank case has just been stated.
If the corporation is liable to the certificate-holder when
the owner is permitted to make a transfer without surrender
of the old certificate, it should follow that the corporation
would likewise be liable where transfer is permitted at the
instance of one who has attached the stock standing in the
name of the registered holder and has bought in his legal
title at a judicial sale.
S was the owner of shares in a national bank. He
assigned the certificates to H accompanied by a signed power
of attorney. H demanded a transfer but was refused. The
bank sued S. attached the stock standing in his name, caused
it to be sold, and it was purchased by R. H then sold
his certificates to A. While H held them, dividends were
declared by the bank, but that proportion of the dividends
applicable to the shares represented by H's certificates was
not paid to him. After A acquired the certificates, further
dividends were declared, and A, without demanding trans-
fer, sued the bank for the sum to which he would have
been entitled had a transfer been made. A was permitted
to recover. The court was of opinion that S's assignment
of the certificates to H had transferred the "entire legal
and equitable title" to H and that this title had passed to
A. The stock was therefore A's stock and he was not bound
to demand a transfer, in view of the fact that the demand.
of his vendor. H, had been met with refusal. " It is further
argued," said the court, "that plaintiff's remedy was an
action in equity to compel a transfer on the books, or an
action against the bank for its wrong and to recover the
damages suffered. That such remedies exist does not alter
plaintiff's right to pursue that which he has chosen. Each
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of those remedies would inevitably stand upon H's owner-
ship. To compel the bank to register is to concede the
validity of the transfer and found a right upon it, and
damages could only be awarded to the extent of the stock
and dividends on the same theory. And if, as we have said,
H became the absolute owner as between himself and the
bank, he must be awarded the right of an owner, whatever
other remedies exist." 12 The court in fhis case seems to
assume that its decision cannot be justified except upon the
theory that the delivery of the certificates passed title to the
stock. It is submitted that this assumption is unwarranted.
When the bank attached S's stock the attachment bound
nothing except what S had. S had the legal title to the
shares because they still stood in his name, but he had sub-
jected that title to an equity in favor of H, who had given
value for the certificates and had acquired a right against
the corporation to compel a transfer of the shares to him
upon surrender of the old certificate. The corporation owed
H a duty which it broke when the stock was sold. H,
having demanded transfer, might have compelled an issue
of new shares to himself or he might have sued for dam-
ages.1" Had he sued for damages, his right would have
been to recover the value of the stock, which would, of
course, include and exceed the amount of the dividends
declared upon it. In the case under discussion, therefore,
A was clearly entitled to recover the sum which was awarded
to him.14 The decision that no new demand need be made
"Robinson v. National Bank of New Berne, 95 N. Y. 637 (1884).
n Strictly speaking, since his right was an equitable right, his remedy
should have been sought in equity. There is a widespread tendency,
however, to allow the certificate-holder to maintain an action at law for
damages when there has been a wrongful refusal to permit a transfer.
See, for example, London, Paris, and American Bank v. Aronstein, 117
F. 6oi (x9o2).
"In Telford Turnpike Co. v. Gerhab (13 Atl. Rep. go, 1888) the
certificate-holder was regarded as entitled to recover only the actual
damage resulting from refusal to permit transfer and not to recover
the value of the stock. This result was reached upon the theory that
title was in the certificate-holder and not in the transferee. Even on
this view, the refusal to transfer was a conversion. It is submitted,
however, that the certificate-holder had no legal title and that his right
against the corporation arose out of the breach of its duty to require
surrender of the old certificate.
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by him certainly has common-sense to commend it. The
real difficulty in the case would arise if A, after recovering
his dividend claim, w ere then to assert his right to have
shares issued to him or to recover damages for their full
value. On the theory on which the case was decided he
would seem to have the right to do this. On the theory
that he had never acquired a legal title, his proper course
would not be to sue for a dividend but to seek in the first
instance to compel an issue of stock or the payment of full
damages.'"
In the cases hitherto discussed there has been a collision
of equities between the holder for value of the old certificate
and one who has purchased the new certificate. Let a case
now be supposed in which a trustee causes stock constituting
a part of the trust estate to be registered in his own name.
The beneficiary knows nothing of the registration. The
corporation supposes the trustee to be the absolute owner,
and this belief is shared by A, to whom the trustee sells
the certificate. The trustee converts the proceeds. No
transfer is made upon the books. What are the relative
rights of A and the beneficiary? In VcNeil v. Bank 16 the
legal owner was regarded as having given to his broker an
opportunity to deceive the innocent purchaser by placing in
the broker's hands a certificate and an assignment duly en-
dorsed. In the case now under discussion it cannot be said
that the beneficiary has been derelict in not investigating
the condition of the registry. If not, how can an estoppel
" It has been decided that where the assignee of a certificate notifies
the corporation after a dividend has been declared but before it is paid,
he is entitled to the dividend and may sue the corporation for it
although there has been no transfer. Timberlake v. Shippers' Com-
press Co., 72 Miss. 323 (I895). It will be perceived, however, that
such a case as this presents a different problem from that under dis-
cussion. In the Mississippi case the corporation had not disputed the
right of the holder of the certificate to be registered as a shareholder.
The only question was whether the corporation might safely rely upon
the rule which requires it to pay dividends to the registered owner of
the shares, or whether it was bound by a notice that the registered
owner had assigned his rights so that it became liable to pay to the
assignee. The decision is of doubtful soundness, however. There
should be as little relaxation as possible of the rule which protects the
corporation if it pays dividends to the registered stockholder.
1146 N. Y. 325 (1871). See AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, VOl. lii, 749.
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be alleged against him? If he is not estopped, shall he be
permitted to assert his prior and equal equity against the
equity of A? If the view were to be accepted that the legal
title passed to A when he purchased the certificate, then the
beneficiary could not compel a surrender of the certificate
nor could he prevent A from causing a transfer to be made
to himself on the company's books. On the same theory, if
the company, upon discovering the fact of trusteeship, were
to issue a certificate to the beneficiary without A's consent,
A could compel the company to recognize his right by
issuing a new certificate to him or could treat the refusal
to transfer to him as a conversion. If, however, A has no
legal title, is he in a position to complain in case the cor-
poration leaves him in possession. of the old certificate and
issues a new certificate to the beneficiary, whose equity is
equal and prior?
The facts thus supposed to exist are not dissimilar to
those of Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co.'1
R was trustee under the will of S. An equitable pro-
ceeding was instituted against R in Maryland alleging a
misapplication of trust funds, including certain shares of
stock in the B company which stood in R's individual
name.' A temporary injunction was granted and while the
suit was pending R removed to New York. R was dis-
missed from his trusteeship in the proceeding above referred
to and one P was substituted, and R was directed to trans-
fer to P the stock standing in his name. An action was
then brought against R in New York to enforce the transfer,
and the final judgment in that action declared that the shares
standing in R's name belonged to the trust estate and
directed the B company to issue new certificates to P, the
substituted trustee, and ordered that the certificates out-
standing in the name of R be surrendered for cancellation.
21 57 N. Y. 616 (1874).
"If the registration, and therefore the certificate, discloses trustee-
ship, one claiming as vendee will acquire no right if the trustee has no
power of sale. Where the corporation has notice of the trust it should
permit no transfer without making inquiry for the cestui and for evi-
dence of his assent to the transfer. Geyser-Marine Gold Min. Co. v.
Stark, io6 Fed. Rep. 558 (igoi).
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The B company issued new certificates to P and cancelled
the entries of stock standing in the name of R but did so
without surrender of the old certificates. While the Mary-
land proceeding was pending R had executed blank powers
of attorney annexed to the certificates for the stock in ques-
tion. The certificates with annexed powers of attorney came
into the possession of one G. After the issue of the new
certificates to P, but without any notice of the issue, A
lent money to G and took the old certificates as collateral.
A as pledgee subsequently attempted to sell them, but B's
president made announcements at the sale such that A was
compelled to bid in the certificates himself for a nominal
sum. He thereupon demanded a transfer, which was re-
fused. Judgment upon a verdict for A was affirmed upon
appeal. The court regarded the old certificates as a "con-
tinuing affirmation" of R's absolute ownership of the shares
represented by the certificates. To the contention that there
was no affirmative evidence of the delivery of these certifi-
cates by R to G, the answer was given that as the certificates
were regular upon their face, gave no notice of R's trustee-
ship, and were accompanied by a power of attorney in proper
form, the inference must be that they were delivered in the
ordinary course of business unless there was evidence to
the contrary. To the suggestion that under the doctrine of
lis pendens A was affected with notice of R's trusteeship
it was replied that certainly the pendency of an action in
Maryland was not constructive notice to a New Yorker, and
that while the pendency of the action in New York might
have the effect contended for in the case of real estate it had
no application to a commercial transaction. 19 The discus-
sion by Dwight, J., in this case of the extremely interesting
questions above suggested is most unsatisfactory. He cites
McNeil v. Bank in support of the proposition that "one
who takes an assignment of a stock certificate, as between
him and the transferrer, takes the whole title, both legal and
equitable." If this be true, then (as already intimated) the
1The applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to stock transactions
was considered but not decided in Dovey's, App., 97 Pa. 153 (1881).
See also Sprague v. Cocheco Mfg. Co., io Blatchf. 173 (1872).
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act of the company in refusing a transfer was a conversion
of the stock for which an action at law would lie. No
question of estoppel or misrepresentation arises. It is the
simple case of an unauthorized refusal to recognize an
owner's legal dominion. The court, however, does not rest
the decision upon this ground, but prefers to regard the old
certificate as a continuing affirmation that R was the owner
and to award damages to A on the groundl that the company
was estopped from disputing the title of one who had pur-
chased on the faith of the affirmation. This view is incon-
sistent with the proposition just cited. If when G took the
old certificates from R he acquired "the whole title, legal
and equitable," then obviously A acquired that title from
G. Since A, on this view, himself became the owner, he
could not have been deceived by a representation that R
was the owner. If, however, R was the holder of the legal
title until but not after the moment when transfer was made
to P, then there is a basis for the view that the corporation,
by suffering the certificate to remain outstanding, repre-
sented to A as a subsequent holder that R continued to
be the owner. But if this view be accepted, immediately a
question arises which the court failed to consider: How
was A damaged by the representation? Suppose A had
bought from G while R actually was the registered owner.
Which equity would prevail-A's or that of the beneficiary?
As pointed out above, the beneficiary, represented by P, the
substituted trustee, has not estopped himself from asserting
his prior equity. Nevertheless, commercial convenience
seems to require that protection shall be given to A as being
the holder of the certificate. Upon such a state of facts, the
two theories of the passage of the legal title approach each
other almost to the point of contact. If A is the title-
holder, the refusal to transfer to him is a conversion. If A
is not the title-holder, he has, in virtue of his possession of
the endorsed certificate, so clear a right to compel the con-
veyance of the legal title that the transfer of that title, even
to the holder of a prior equity, is an infringement of that
right. If, instead of permitting a transfer to P, the cor-
poration had caused P and A to interplead while the legal
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title remained in R, it is submitted that A would have been
entitled to a decree. To reach this conclusion in a case in
which there is no element of estoppel against P involves the
weighing of the opposing equities. Much as can be said
in favor of their abstract equality, A, in the judgment of
commercial men, would be regarded as occupying the
stronger position in virtue of his possession of the docu-
ment which (like the bill of lading) is the symbol of prop-
erty. It follows that the court should have assigned as the
basis of decision either the view that A held the legal title
or the view that he had acquired G's right as certificate-
holder and that this right, even prior to the transfer to P,
was an equity enforceable as against that of the beneficiary.
The simultaneous adoption of both views leads, it is sub-
mitted, only to confusion of thought.
Hardly less satisfactory than the attempt to accept both
views is the expedient of regarding title as passing by de-
livery of the certificate "between the parties," but not "as
to the corporation or third persons." 20 The title either
passes or it does not. If it passes, it passes as to all the
world. In Winter v. Montgomery Gas-Light Co.,21 the
right of an unregistered holder of a certificate assigned to
him by a trustee was held to prevail over the prior right of
the cestui que trust. The stock had been transferred by the
trustee into the name of an individual who had delivered
the endorsed certificate back to the trustee. The trustee then
made delivery to the purchaser, who had no notice of the
trust. The title was regarded as having passed to the trans-
feree in virtue of the transfer and as having then passed to
the purchaser in virtue of the delivery of the certificate.
The result is in harmony with that reached in Holbrook v.
New Jersey Zinc Co., supra, and in other American cases.
22
"0 Another illustration of the same conception is seen in the attempt
to treat persons as "partners as to third persons, but not inter se."
See remarks of Lord Bramwell in Bullen v. Sharp (L. R. I C. P. 86;
1865). If such a conception is permissible in the case of the commer-
cial relation of partnership, why not in the domestic relation of hus-
band and wife?" 89 Ala. 544 (1890).
'Salisbury Mills v. Townsend, io9 Mass. 115 (1871) ; Stenson v.
Thornton, 56 Ga. 377 (1876).
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In England, on the other hand, the unregistered certificate-
holder is not recognized as having a weightier equity than
the cestui que trust. In Dodds v. Hills,2 3 indeed, effect was
given to the suggestion that the certificate-holder was essen-
tially in the position of a legal owner, as he has the right to
call in the legal title. The court accordingly declined, on a
bill filed by the cestui, to set aside a transfer on the books
made, after notice of the trust, by one who had innocently
acquired the certificate before such notice. But in the later
English cases 24 the prior right of the cestui is protected;
and in one case 25 protection was given him even as against
one who had taken a transfer, where it appeared that certain
of the essential blanks in the power had been filled in by the
transferee himself. The English decisions on this point are,
therefore, consistent only with the view that the legal title
passes by transfer on the books. The American decisions
have been influenced by the conception that title passes
with the certificate; but they are consistent with the other
view, provided it is supplemented by the theory that the
equity of the certificate-holder should prevail over the prior
equity of the cestui que trust.
An important aspect of stock transfers is that which in-
volves the relative priorities of the certificate-holder and
attaching creditors of the registered owner.20 If the at-
tachment has been levied by service at the office of the cor-
poration, the dominion of the registered owner over his
shares is suspended. A subsequent delivery of the certificate,
even to a bona-fide purchaser for value and without notice,
cannot disturb the priority of the attaching creditor.
27
Let it be supposed, on the other hand, that the delivery
U2 Hem. and M. 42 (1865).
"Shropshire, etc., Co. v. Regina, L. R. 7 H. L. 496 (1875) ; Roots v.
Williamson, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 485 (1888). The attempt in this last case
to "distinguish" Dodds v. Hills is hardly satisfactory.
'Powell v. London, etc., Bank [1893], 2 Ch. 555-
' A debtor's- stock may, by statute, be reached by levying an attach-
ment at the office of the corporation. Some statutes give to the pur-
chaser at a judicial sale the right to insist on the issue of a new
certificate. For instances of seizure of stock certificates see Puget
Sound Bank v. Mather, 6o Minn. 362 (1895), and Harris v. Bank of
Mobile, 5 La. Ann. 539 (i85o).
'Kentucky Bank v. Avery, 12 Nat Corp. Rep. iii (i896).
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of the certificate takes place before the levy of the attach-
ment. The attaching creditor is not a purchaser for value.
He takes only what his debtor has-a legal title subject to
an equity in favor of the certificate-holder." If the cer-
tificate-holder is regarded as having a legal title, the same
result follows. If the attaching creditor is to be given
priority, it must be upon the theory that he is in some way
benefited by the statutory provision that stock shall be trans-
ferable only in the company's books. 29  If such a view is
adopted, it is possible to argue that his priority can exist
only if he has no notice of a delivery of the certificate. 30 If,
however, the theory is that the debt was contracted in re-
liance upon the debtor's record title, it is difficult to perceive
how notice subsequent to the origin of the debt and before
levy 31 or sale 32 can deprive him of his rights. If the theory
is that he should be preferred because he has been led by the
record title to incur the expense of the attachment, the
answer is twofold: first, that his prior right ought not in
any event to entitle him to more than repayment of his dis-
bursement; and, second, that the creditor of a failing debtor
knows perfectly well that the attachment will probably be
barren and levies it only in the forlorn hope that no pledge
or sale of the certificate has been made.
Mr. Cook, in his excellent work on corporations,
33 sug-
gests that the distinction between the "legal" and the
"equitable" title is unsatisfactory. Mr. Lowell 34 takes a
similar view. It is submitted, however, that the distinction
exists and must be recognized. The real difficulties arise
from a failure to recognize and enforce the consequences of
' See Continental Nat'l Bank v. Eliot Nat'l Bank, 7 Fed. Rep. 369
(1881), and other cases cited by Harriman in the excellent discussion
of this subject already refered to. AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, vol.
xxxvi, N. S., at page 86. The concluding paragraphs of this paper,
relating to the right of attaching creditors, are scarcely more than a
summary of Mr. Harriman's conclusions.
'Fisher v. Essex Bank, 5 Gray, 373 (1855).
See, for example, the opinion of Story, J., in Black v. Zacharie,
3 How. 483 (845).
" Central Nat'l Bk. v. Williston, 138 Mass. 244 (i885).
'Wilson v. St. Louis, etc., Co., io8 Mo. 588 (1891).
"A Treatise on the Law of Corporations (5 ed.), § 414.
" Lowell on Transfer of Stock, 104.
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the distinction. Unless attention is paid to the difference
between registration and the right to be registered (in what-
ever terms we choose to express the discrimination) it will
not be surprising to find in the law that "confusion, doubt,
and difficulty" of which Mr. Cook complains.
35
George Wharton Pepper.
* § 414.
